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YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNWANTED 
BODILY INTRUSION—UNLESS OF COURSE THERE IS A 
COURT ORDER 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
 APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT 
People v. Smith1 
(decided March 16, 2012) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In our modern society few rights are as fundamental to priva-
cy and human dignity as the right to be free from unwanted bodily in-
trusion by the government.2  This right is derived from the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides indi-
viduals with the right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures by the government.3  In identical language to that of the Fourth 
Amendment, Article 1 Section 12 of the New York State Constitution 
similarly affords individuals with protections against unreasonable 
search and seizures.4  However, despite the mirrored language, the 
New York and federal interpretations of those rights are not identical.  
New York courts generally interpret search and seizure protections 
under the state constitution more generously than that of its federal 
counterparts, and in many ways expand the rights conferred on indi-
viduals by the federal courts.5 
Neither federal nor state law places an absolute ban on 
searches and seizures, but rather each in effect prohibits those search-
es and seizures that are deemed unreasonable.6  The issue then turns 
 
1 940 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012). 
2 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
5 People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
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to what is reasonable?  The most basic rule in this area is that all 
searches and seizures conducted absent a warrant, issued by a neutral 
magistrate and based on probable cause, are presumptively unreason-
able.7  But this general rule is only the starting point.  Engrained in 
the extensive body of search and seizure law, at both federal and state 
levels, are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement that may 
save an otherwise unlawful search or seizure from amounting to a 
constitutional violation.8 
The next question is what happens if the government conducts 
an unreasonable search or seizure?  Although neither the federal nor 
the state constitution provides a mechanism for enforcement, the ju-
dicially created exclusionary rule may, under conforming circum-
stances, allow for the suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence at trial.9  The exclusionary rule was created as remedial 
measure available to an aggrieved party who suffered a constitutional 
violation, but more importantly, exists as a deterrent for unlawful po-
lice conduct.10  As the creation of the exclusionary rule was intended 
to serve an extrinsic social policy, application of the rule is not auto-
matic and may allow for the introduction of otherwise unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence where suppression would unreasonably 
frustrate the administration of justice.11 
In the recent decision of People v. Smith, the New York Ap-
pellate Division held that tasing an uncooperative, but otherwise non-
combative, suspect in order to obtain a DNA sample was an exces-
sive use of force and therefore an unreasonable search and seizure 
under both the federal and state constitutions.12  The court further 
held that because the search and seizure was constitutionally unrea-
sonable, the evidence obtained as a direct result of the constitutional 
violation, namely the DNA sample, required suppression at trial.13 
This case note will explore both federal and New York State 
search and seizure jurisprudence, as well as the application of the 
prophylactic exclusionary rule.  Section I of this article lays out the 
factual and procedural background of the Smith case.  Section II dis-
 
7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
8 See infra notes, 78-79, 235-36. 
9 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009). 
10 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 651, 655-56, 659 (1961). 
11 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984). 
12 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78. 
13 Id. at 379. 
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cusses the federal search and seizure protections afforded to all per-
sons under the Fourth Amendment and addresses what constitutes a 
search and seizure, what is required for a reasonable search and sei-
zure, the warrant requirement, and the categorical exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.  Section III specifically addresses excessive 
force claims and when, under federal law, the use of force rises to the 
level of an unreasonable search or seizure.  Section IV addresses the 
exclusionary rule, when it calls for the suppression of evidence, and 
the exceptions to the rule.  Section V compares and contrasts New 
York search and seizure law, excessive force claims, and the exclu-
sionary rule with federal precedent.  Section VI discusses the Smith 
decision through the scope of both New York and federal law, and 
lastly, Section VII concludes this case note. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PEOPLE V. 
SMITH 
In July of 2006, four armed men robbed two separate homes 
in Niagara Falls, New York.14  Roughly five months later, two armed 
men robbed a gas station also located in the same town.15  Approxi-
mately two years after the gas station robbery, the defendant, Ryan 
Smith (hereinafter “Smith”), “was convicted of Assault in the third 
degree,” a crime completely unrelated to the earlier robberies.16  As a 
result of this conviction, a DNA sample was taken from Smith and 
entered into the Combined DNA Index System (hereinafter 
“CODIS”).17  Once Smith’s DNA was in the CODIS system, “there 
was a ‘hit’ indicating that his DNA matched evidence collected in the 
2006 home invasions and the gas station robbery.”18  Thereafter, in 
August of 2008, the People filed an order to show cause to compel 
Smith to submit to a DNA test in the form of a buccal swab.19  While 
Smith received notice of the People’s order to show cause, he failed 
to appear in court on the indicated return date.20  On said return date, 
the court granted the People’s request and issued the order compel-
ling Smith “to provide a buccal swab ‘to be taken by or at the direc-
 
14 Id. at 375. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 375-76. 
17 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 375-76. 
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tion of’ ” the Niagara Falls Police Department (hereinafter 
“NFPD”).21  Smith complied with the order and allowed the NFPD to 
obtain a sample, but by no fault of his own, “the DNA sample was 
sent to the incorrect lab and was ‘compromised[,]’ ” requiring the 
People to obtain a second order.22  Again, the People requested an or-
der to compel Smith to submit to a buccal swab, only this time the 
request was made “by a letter to the court in September 2008.”23  At 
no time was Smith notified of the People’s second application for a 
duplicate order, nor was he served with a copy of the second order is-
sued by the court.24  Shortly thereafter, the police approached Smith 
on the street, handcuffed him and took him to the police station 
where officers attempted to take the court ordered sample.25  Smith 
was picked up by the police at 6:00 P.M.26  At approximately 6:18 
P.M. that same evening, after refusing to submit to the test, the police 
tased Smith’s bare skin in order to force his compliance.27 
Following a jury trial, Smith was convicted of five counts of 
first degree burglary and seven counts of first degree robbery.28  
Smith appealed the conviction on the grounds that the county court 
improperly denied his pretrial motion to suppress the DNA evidence 
and argued that “he lacked notice of the application seeking to com-
pel him to provide a buccal swab and because the police used exces-
sive force to obtain the swab.”29  The New York State Appellate Di-
vision found in favor of Smith with respect to both claims.30  
 
21 Id. 




26 Id. at 378. 
27 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376, 378.  When the police picked up Smith on the evening in 
question, he did not resist the police and voluntarily entered the police vehicle “even though 
the police did not tell him why he had to accompany them.”  Id. at 378.  Once at the station, 
Smith was “placed in a secure room, where he was handcuffed, seated to the floor, and sur-
rounded by three patrol officers and two detectives.”  Id.  When the officers tried to take 
Smith’s DNA sample, at no time did he “threaten, fight with, or physically resist . . . rather, 
he simply refused to open his mouth to allow the officers to obtain a buccal swab.”  Id. 
28 Id. at 375. 
29 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 375.  Although not expressly provided for by statute, the New 
York Court of Appeals has recognized that a court may issue an order “to compel uncharged 
suspects to supply a DNA sample” if certain requirements are satisfied.  Id. at 376.  In the 
present case the court found that all necessary requirements were satisfied and Smith did not 
challenge this issue on Appeal.  Id. 
30 Id. at 375. 
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Specifically, the court held that Smith’s due process rights were vio-
lated when the second order was issued without adequate notice and 
an opportunity to be heard.31  The court further held that Smith’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of the excessive 
force used by the police to obtain the sample.32  As a result, the court 
reversed the county court’s judgment, granted Smith’s motion to sup-
press the DNA evidence, and ordered a new trial.33 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROTECTIONS 
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals the right to “be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures [which] shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things to be seized.”34  This right seeks to protect “the 
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and 
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their 
direction.”35  Accordingly, these protections apply to searches and 
seizures by the government or individuals acting as a government 
agent, but does not protect against a search or seizure effected by a 
purely private party, no matter how arbitrary.36 
In order to qualify for Fourth Amendment protections, the 
challenged government activity must constitute either a search or sei-
zure within the meaning of the Constitution.37  Absent a finding that 
either a search or a seizure was conducted the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable.38 
 
31 Id. at 377.  Although the court found that Smith’s DNA evidence should have been 
suppressed on both due process and excessive force grounds, the scope of this article will be 
limited to the discussion of Smith’s search and seizure rights and his excessive force claim.  
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 377. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 379. 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
35 Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).  Fourth Amend-
ment protections apply only to intrusions by Government actors, or those private parties who 
“act as an instrument or agent of the Government.”  Id. 
36 Id. at 614. 
37 Thomas K. Clancy, What Is A "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 
70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). 
38 Id. 
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A. Search and Seizure Defined 
What is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment?  In its formative years, Fourth Amendment law was narrowly 
interpreted based upon the amendment’s literal language, which was 
construed as principally protecting individuals’ property interests.39  
During those early years, a search literally required a physical tres-
pass into a constitutionally protected area, i.e., “persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects.”40  It was not until 1967 with the case of United 
States v. Katz,41 one of the most influential cases in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, that this physical trespass standard was aban-
doned and was replaced with a definition based on protecting indi-
viduals’ privacy, rather than property interests.42  It was in Katz that 
the Court famously established “that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people [ ] not simply areas.”43  Interestingly, the groundbreaking im-
pact of the Katz decision did not come from the majority opinion, but 
instead the concurring opinion by Justice Harlan.44  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Harlan coined the phrase “a reasonable expectation 
of privacy” which provided the basis of the Court’s present definition 
of a search.45  As the Court explained in United States v. Jacobsen,46 
“[a] ‘search’ occurs whenever an expectation of privacy that society 
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”47 
In Katz, the Court formulated a two-part test to determine 
whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.48  When applying this test, the first inquiry is whether “the indi-
vidual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of 
the challenged search[.]”49  The second being, “is society is willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable[.]”50  Whether an invasion of 
 
39 Michael Campbell, Defining A Fourth Amendment Search:  A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 192 (1986). 
40 Id. 
41 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
42 Campbell, supra note 39, at 193. 
43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44 Id. at 360-62. 
45 WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 3 (3d ed. 2010). 
46 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
47 Id. at 113. 
48 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  As such, purely subjective expectations of privacy are not recognized as deserving 
of Fourth Amendment protection.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). 
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a person’s privacy is reasonable “must be appraised on the basis of 
facts as they existed at the time that the invasion occurred.”51 
What an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”; 
however, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office,” will not.52  Another relevant consideration is 
the manner in which the investigation was conducted.  As seen in ca-
nine-sniff cases, discriminate but nonintrusive investigative methods, 
which reveal only evidence of criminality and arguably no other pri-
vate information, are not considered searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.53  In stark contrast, when it comes to obtaining samples, 
the Court has long recognized a forced intrusion into a person’s body 
for the purpose of obtaining a blood sample, a urine sample, or a 
breath test constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment as each 
of these intrusions raise serious concerns about a person’s bodily in-
tegrity.54 
Unlike the blanket definition of a “search” as applied to both 
persons and places, when considering whether a “seizure” occurred 
the standards are different for both persons and property.  A “ ‘sei-
zure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”55  Whereas 
a “seizure” of a person occurs if “in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave.”56  Claiming “seizure” of a person re-
quires a showing that an officer “by means of physical force or show 
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”57  It 
reasonably follows that any restraint exerted on a person for the pur-
pose of conducting a search consequently constitutes a seizure. 
 
51 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115. 
52 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
53 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. 
54 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17. 
55 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
56 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  In order to ensure “that the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of the individual 
being approached” this test does not call for consideration of how an individual responded to 
the actions of police officers.  Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988). 
57 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991). 
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B. Satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment—What is 
Reasonable? 
Once it is established that the government effectuated a search 
or seizure, the next inquiry is whether the search or seizure was rea-
sonable under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  As it flows 
naturally from the language of the Fourth Amendment, not all 
searches and seizures are barred, but rather, only those which are un-
reasonable.58  To determine if a search or seizure was reasonable, 
courts must consider all of the surrounding circumstances, including 
the “nature of the search or seizure itself,” and then balance the de-
gree of the intrusion on the individual’s constitutionally protected 
rights against the “promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”59 
As the Court stated in Katz, “the most basic constitutional rule 
in this area [ ] that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few well estab-
lished and well delineated exceptions.’ ”60  With respect to the issu-
ance of warrants and warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures, the 
most basic requirement for Fourth Amendment satisfaction is the ex-
istence of probable cause. 
By the vey terms of the Fourth Amendment, probable 
cause is indispensible to the issuance of a valid war-
rant.  That constitutional sine qua non applies to the 
search warrant and arrest warrant alike.  The case law, 
moreover, has also established probable cause as the 
necessary predicate for both a reasonable warrantless 
search for evidence and a reasonable warrantless ar-
rest.61 
Although there is no mechanical test to apply to determine whether 
probable cause existed, the Court in Brinegar v. United States62 artic-
ulated a widely accepted definition and stated as follows: 
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very 
 
58 Skinner, 489 U.S at 619. 
59 Id. 
60 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 
357). 
61 GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 13. 
62 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
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name implies, we deal with probabilities.  These are 
not technical; they are the factual and practical consid-
erations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru-
dent men, not legal technicians, act. . . .  “The sub-
stance of all the definitions” of probable cause “is a 
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”  And this 
“means less than evidence which would justify con-
demnation” or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for 
the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United 
States.63  Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has 
come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable 
cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within 
their (the officers’) knowledge, and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in 
the belief that” an offense has been or is being com-
mitted.64 
In the early years of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, police 
were not required to obtain a warrant whenever feasible, but rather, it 
was generally accepted that police merely must “behave reasonably 
whenever they search[ed] and whenever they seize[ed], without cali-
brating too finely just what reasonable behavior involved.”65  It was 
not until the “coming of the Warren Court and its so-called ‘Criminal 
Law Revolution’ . . . [that the] Court determined [ ] the most effec-
tive way to maximize Fourth Amendment protection was, whenever 
possible, to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between 
‘the policeman and his quarry.’ ”66  It was at this point that the war-
rant requirement became an integral part of Fourth Amendment law 
requiring police to obtain a warrant whenever feasible.67  In order to 
encourage adherence to this warrant requirement, a lesser degree of 
probable cause was, and still is required to support a warrant as valid 
than any warrantless police activity.68 
The warrant requirement provides individuals with two dis-
tinct protections.  The first is to eliminate searches without probable 
 
63 11 U.S. 339 (1813). 
64 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-77 (quoting Locke, 11 U.S. at 348) (citation omitted). 
65 GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 14. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 15. 
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cause.69  This interest is carried out by the issuance of a warrant be-
cause it requires a neutral judge or magistrate to make a “careful prior 
determination of necessity.”70  Second, where a judge or magistrate 
determines that a search or seizure is necessary, the purpose of the 
warrant is to then limit the scope of the search or seizure as much as 
possible in order to avoid general, unrestricted rummaging through an 
individual’s property.71  Discussing the importance of the warrant re-
quirement, the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire72 stated: 
[t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of 
our constitutional law for decades, and it has deter-
mined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts 
all over this country.  It is not an inconvenience to be 
somehow weighed against the claims of police effi-
ciency.  It is, or should be, an important working part 
of our machinery of government, operating as a matter 
of course to check the well-intentioned but mistakenly 
over-zealous, executive officers who are a part of any 
system of law enforcement.  If it is to be a true guide 
to constitutional police action, rather than just a pious 
phrase, then [t]he exceptions cannot be enthroned into 
the rule.73 
In Schmerber v. California,74 the Court addressed the sensi-
tive nature of search and seizure cases involving bodily intrusions 
and surgical procedures performed for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence of criminality.75  In the context of these special cases, the ordi-
nary Fourth Amendment requirements should be considered merely 
as threshold requirements.76  In its decision, the Court provided three 
additional factors to balance when determining reasonableness: “the 
extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the 
individual. . . .  [T]he extent of intrusion upon the individual’s digni-
tary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity. . . .  [And] 
[w]eighed against these interests is the community’s interest in fairly 
 
69 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
73 Id. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
75 Id. at 768-70. 
76 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985). 
10
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and accurately determining guilt and innocence.77 
C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
It is a well accepted principle that the warrant requirement is 
not an absolute; the controversial question is under what circum-
stances is dispensing with this requirement justified?  Dispensing 
with the warrant requirement, as previously stated, is at least in theo-
ry, “subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions.”78  These well recognized, or categorical exceptions in-
clude: search incident to a lawful arrest; exigent circumstances; the 
plain view doctrine; consent; the stop and frisk exception; the auto-
mobile exception; the suitcase/container exception; and the traffic 
stop exception.79  Courts place the burden on those seeking to invoke 
an exception to the traditional warrant requirement to show that under 
the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation were imperative.80  
With each of these exceptions comes an extensive body of law; how-
ever, for the purposes of this case note, only those exceptions rele-
vant to the facts of Smith, the case at hand, will be discussed.81 
When considering whether there is an applicable exception to 
the warrant requirement justifying the particular search or seizure and 
thereby saving it from violating the Fourth Amendment, courts must 
ask “what is the predicate for the initial intrusion and [ ] what is the 
permitted scope of what may be done under the exception.”82 
1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest 
One recognized exception to the warrant requirement occurs 
where there is a search incident to lawful arrest, in which case the 
warrantless search “may generally extend to the area that is consid-
ered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person ar-
rested.”83  Once a lawful arrest is made, based on a showing of the 
requisite probable cause, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
 
77 Id. at 760-62. 
78 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
79 GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 16-21. 
80  Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455. 
81 While the opinion in Smith does not specifically address each potentially applicable ex-
ception, this case note will discuss each exception relevant to the facts of the case. 
82 GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 16. 
83 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 456. 
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subsequently search the arrestee, and further, to seize any weapons or 
evidence that may be in the arrestee’s possession.84  However, any 
search conducted incident to an arrest must be “substantially contem-
poraneous with the arrest and it is confined to the immediate vicinity 
of the arrest.”85 
2. Exigent or Emergency Circumstances 
Another exception to the warrant requirement deals with 
searches and seizures incident to exigent or emergency circumstanc-
es.  Exigent circumstances have been defined as “situations where 
‘real[,] immediate and serious consequences’ will ‘certainly occur’ if 
a police officer postpones action to obtain a warrant.”86  This excep-
tion can be broken down into four sub-categories of exigencies: “hot 
pursuit of a fleeing felon[,]”87 preventing the “imminent destruction 
of evidence,”88 “the need to prevent a suspect’s escape,” and neutral-
izing “the risk of danger to the police or to other persons.”89  Under 
this exception, absent a finding of probable cause, one of these four 
sub-categories of exigent circumstances must exist for a warrantless 
search or seizure to be constitutional.90  Of these four subcategories, 
preventing the destruction of evidence and protecting police/public 
welfare are relevant to the within discussion of Smith. 
With respect to preservation of evidence, “[w]here there are 
exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now 
or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to 
permit action without prior judicial evaluation.”91  The Court has rec-
ognized the need to preserve evidence of an individual’s blood-
alcohol content as a time sensitive issue, constituting an “emergency” 
circumstance under Fourth Amendment law.92  However, unlike evi-
dence of blood-alcohol content, the genetic character of DNA evi-
 
84 United States. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
85 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 456.  This area has become known as the Chimel perimeter and 
includes “the entire area within the reach, lunge, or grasp of the arrestee.”  GREENHALGH, 
supra note 45, at 16. 
86 United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ewolski v. City 
of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002). 
87 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970). 
88 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984). 
89 Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). 
90 Id. 
91 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973). 
92 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (1966). 
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dence is “not subject to change” and therefore by its very nature can-
not fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant re-
quirement.93 
As far as protecting the police and public welfare, the Court in 
Warden v. Hayden94 emphasized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does 
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if 
to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”95  
Accordingly, under this sub-category, justification for a warrantless 
search or seizure requires a showing, under the totality of the circum-
stances, that “law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis 
for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or 
themselves from serious harm; and [that] the search’s scope and 
manner were reasonable to meet the need.”96 
3. Consent 
The consent exception is rooted in the principle that an indi-
vidual may waive any of his constitutional rights, including those 
protected under the Fourth Amendment.97  A search authorized by 
consent does not require probable cause, and therefore, law enforce-
ment officers frequently seek consent to obtain evidence where there 
is some indicia of illegal activity, but where said activity does not rise 
to the level required to obtain a warrant.98  When dealing with the is-
sue of consent the key questions are: who gave the consent, specifi-
cally did the consenter have, or appear to have, the legal authority to 
consent, and how was the consent obtained.99 
Under this exception, “a search authorized by consent is 
wholly valid . . . [provided] the consent was, in fact, freely and volun-
tarily given.”100  While this exception seems simple enough on its 
 
93 Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264, 265 (E.D. Tex. 1969). 
94 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
95 Id. at 298-99. 
96 United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010). 
97 GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 20. 
98 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).  “[W]hen . . . the government 
relies on consent to justify a warrantless search, it bears the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary.”  United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 
119, 131 (2d Cir. 2006). 
99 GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 20. 
100 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.  In addition to the requirement that consent be voluntary, 
“[t]he individual giving consent must also possess the authority to do so.”  United States v. 
Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).  Both the individual under investigation or a third 
13
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face, difficulties arise in determining voluntariness.101  As Justice 
Frankfurter colorfully put it: “[t]he notion of voluntariness is itself an 
amphibian.”102  Courts should look at the totality of the circumstances 
under which the consent was given to determine if it was in fact vol-
untarily.103  Relevant considerations, none of which are dispositive as 
to the question of voluntariness include: the subjective state of mind 
of the consenter, whether the police questioning or practices were 
subtly coercive, and whether the consenter had knowledge of his 
right to refuse the search.104  Additional considerations include: 
whether the consenter was in custody, in handcuffs, if there was force 
exerted, whether the individual had previously refused to consent, 
and whether the police gained the consent by telling the consenter 
that a warrant would be obtained.105 
Once given, consent may be withdrawn at any time up and 
until the search is complete.  “Withdrawal of consent need not be ef-
fectuated through particular ‘magic words,’ but an intent to withdraw 
consent must be made by [an] unequivocal act or statement.”106  
Withdrawing consent requires “an act clearly inconsistent with the 
apparent consent to search, an unambiguous statement challenging 
the officer’s authority to conduct the search, or some combination of 
both.”107  While a search is being carried out based on consent, police 
officers do not have the authority to order the consenter not to inter-
 
party with authority over the property at issue may validly consent to a search or seizure.  
United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2007).  However, problems arise when 
a third party does not have actual authority over the subject property, but at the time of con-
sent appears to the police to have the necessary authority.  Id.  Accordingly, the question of 
who has authority to consent is examined  “subjectively through the eyes of the policeman at 
the time of the search or seizure.”  GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 20.  Therefore, where an 
officer subjectively believes that the consenter has authority to consent, this apparent author-
ity may be sufficient to uphold the validity of the consent.  Andrus, 483 F.3d at 716-17. 
101 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224. 
102 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604-05 (1961). 
103 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26. 
104 Id. at 229.  Although the consenter’s knowledge of his right to refuse a search is a rele-
vant factor when determining whether or not consent was voluntary, there is no affirmative 
obligation on the part of law enforcement officers to advise an individual of his right to re-
fuse prior to gaining consent.  Id. at 231. 
105 United States v. Lavan, 10 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
106 United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004). 
107 United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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fere with the search.108 
IV. EXCESSIVE FORCE 
Individuals alleging excessive use of force by a government 
official have two available avenues for relief.  The first, is to assert a 
civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983109 seeking damages under civil li-
ability principles for the wrongdoing of the officer.110  The second 
option, during the course of a criminal proceeding, is to seek suppres-
sion of the evidence unconstitutionally obtained as a direct result of 
the alleged excessive use of force.111 
For many years, there was serious debate amongst the federal 
circuits over the source of excessive force protections and the stand-
ard to apply when analyzing such claims.  It was not until 1989 with 
Graham v. Connor112 that the Court resolved the debate over the 
source of excessive force protections.  In Graham, the Court rejected 
the views of the majority of federal courts at that time, which were 
applying a generic substantive due process test based on the assump-
tion “that there is a generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive force,” 
but that the right was not grounded in any particular constitutional 
provision.113  Instead, the Court firmly established that courts should 
analyze each excessive force claim with respect to the specific consti-
tutionally protected right “allegedly infringed by the challenged ap-
plication of force.”114  Accordingly, when examining an excessive 
force claim, courts must first determine which specific constitutional-
ly protected right had allegedly been infringed and “the claim must 
then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard 
which governs that right, rather than some generalized ‘excessive 
force’ standard.”115  Primarily, the constitutional rights of an individ-
ual against excessive use of force are found in the Fourth Amend-
 
108 Id.  During the course of a consent search, courts have recognized such actions as a 
consenter locking the trunk to a vehicle during the course of the consented search as an act 
unequivocal and unambiguous enough to constitute a withdrawal of consent.  Unites States 
v. Ibarra, 731 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Wyo. 1990). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
110 United States v. Arista-Herrera, No. 8:05CR301, 2006 WL 680891, at *4 (D. Neb. 
Feb. 21, 2006). 
111 Id. 
112 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
113 Id. at 393. 
114 Id. at 393-94. 
115 Id. at 394. 
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ment right against unreasonable search and seizure, the Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.116 
A. Classifying the Right 
Excessive force claims are classified by reference to the legal 
status of the individual asserting the claim.117  From arrest to convic-
tion there are four stages: “(1) the initial investigatory stop and/or ar-
rest; (2) an undefined period between ‘arrest’ and ‘pretrial detention’; 
(3) another undefined period referred to as ‘pretrial detention’; and 
(4) post-conviction incarceration.”118  While there is little debate that 
excessive force claims of a convicted prisoner should be analyzed 
under the Eighth Amendment, the classification of the remaining sta-
tuses are not always as clear.119  Generally, courts should analyze 
claims of excessive force by pretrial detainees or arrestees under sub-
stantive due process principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, while analyzing the claims of free citizens under the Fourth 
Amendment.120 
The Court made clear in Graham “that all claims that law en-
forcement officers have used excessive force–deadly or not–in the 
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citi-
zen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . rather than 
under a ‘substantive due process approach.’ ”121  The Court reasoned 
that “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive gov-
ernmental conduct”, and therefore, should guide these claims.122  No-
tably, the Court failed to draw a clear line as to when the course of an 
“arrest” ends and when it evolves into “pretrial detention.”123  This 
 
116 Id. at 394-95. 
117 Brandon J. Demyan, Aldini v. Johnson:  The Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment—
Which Applies to Excessive Force Suits Prior to Arraignment?, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
433, 433 (2010). 
118 H.L. McCormick, Excessive Force Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 URB. 
LAW. 69, 69 (1997). 
119 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). 
120 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 H.L. McCormick, supra note 118, at 69. 
[T]he arrest, and the potential for Fourth Amendment violations, may 
end when the arrestee is handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser.  If 
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gray area, concerning whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment 
protections apply, continues to be a common source of disagreement 
among federal courts. 
B. The Legal Standards 
Once a court determines the legal status of the individual, 
thereby classifying the excessive force claim, it must then apply the 
corresponding constitutional standard, governing that specific 
right.124 
1. Eighth Amendment 
The Eight Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause “was designed to protect those convicted of crimes” while 
serving time as punishment.125  Accordingly, the Eight Amendment 
standard is less protective than that of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments because it applies “only after the State has complied 
with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with crimi-
nal prosecutions.”126  For a sustainable Eighth Amendment claim, an 
inmate must show that the physical force used by the prison official 
inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain which requires “more than or-
dinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”127  Rel-
evant considerations when analyzing Eighth Amendment excessive 
force claims are: 
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the rela-
tionship between the need and the amount of force 
used, [3] the extent of the injury inflicted, . . . [4] the 
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, 
as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on 
the basis of the facts known to them, and any efforts 
 
that is so, then claims of excessive force while en route to the police sta-
tion may require Fourteenth Amendment rather than Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  The different analysis can lead to entirely different results de-
pending on what the [claimant] can prove about the [ ] officer’s state of 
mind and the objective reasonableness of the [officer’s] acts. 
Id. at 70. 
124 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
125 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 
126 Id. at 671 n.40. 
127 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 
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made to temper the severity of a forceful response.128 
Due to the special nature of internal prison security issues, great def-
erence is given to prison administrators with respect to the “adoption 
and execution of policies and practices . . . needed to preserve inter-
nal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”129  It 
reasonably follows that application of the Eighth Amendment in ex-
cessive force claims requires some consideration of the subjective 
state of mind of the officer exerting the force.130 
2. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
As previously mentioned, claims of pretrial detainees and ar-
restees are properly analyzed under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ due process principles.131  The assessment for Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims requires applica-
tion of the four-factor test articulated by the Court in Johnson v. 
Glick.132  Although Johnson was subsequently overturned by Gra-
ham, the four-factor test remains the standard used by courts when 
analyzing excessive force claims under the due process clauses.  Said 
factors are as follows: 
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the rela-
tionship between the need and the amount of force that 
was used, [3] the extent of the injury inflicted, and [4] 
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and  sa-
distically for the very purpose of causing harm.133 
Incarcerating an individual charged, but not yet convicted of a crime, 
is a permissible government practice used to ensure that person is 
present for trial if one should arise.134  However, unlike convicted 
prisoners, pretrial detainees are innocent until proven guilty, and 
therefore “it is not sufficient that the conditions of confinement for 
pretrial detainees merely comport with contemporary standards of 
 
128 Id. at 321. 
129 Id. at 321-22. 
130 Graham, 490 U.S. at 398. 
131 Id. at 395. 
132 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), overruled by Graham, 490 U.S. 386. 
133 Id. at 1033. 
134 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979). 
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decency prescribed by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eight Amendment.”135  While an individual held in pretrial detention 
has, as a prerequisite to his detention, undergone a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause justifying the restraint on his liberty, he may 
only be subjected to the restrictions and conditions of confinement to 
the extent that “those conditions and restrictions do not amount to 
punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.”136 
Whether in a prison, custodial center, or some other form of a 
detention facility, “[o]nce the Government has exercised its conceded 
authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to 
employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention.”137  
Incident to detention is the loss, in varying degrees, of the freedom of 
to make personal choices and privacy.138  However, unless the gov-
ernment action taken against a pretrial detainee is construed as pun-
ishment, the deprivation of liberty incident to detention does not rise 
to the level of a due process violation.139  The mere interference “with 
[a] detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortable as possible 
and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not 
convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punish-
ment.’ ”140 
3. Fourth Amendment 
Excessive force claims by free citizens during the course of an 
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ are analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard.141  Determin-
ing whether the force used was reasonable, calls for a balancing of 
the intrusion on the individual’s constitutionally protected Fourth 
Amendment interests’ against “the countervailing governmental in-
terests at stake.”142  There is no “precise definition or mechanical ap-
plication” of the reasonableness test, and as a result, proper applica-
tion requires consideration of all the surrounding facts and 
 
135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136 Id. at 535-37. 
137 Id. at 537. 
138 Id. 
139 Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-37. 
140 Id. at 537. 
141 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
142 Id. at 396. 
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circumstances in every individual case.143  Relevant considerations 
include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses 
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and wheth-
er he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.”144 
When applying the objective reasonableness standard, “[t]he 
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight.”145  This requires the court to consider the 
reasonableness of the use of force at the moment it was applied rather 
than in light of subsequent knowledge or information, which would 
clearly have rendered the use of force unnecessary.146  In addition, 
“the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about 
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”147  
However, the question of reasonableness remains objective in that it 
asks “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard 
for their underlying intent or motivation.”148  In other words, force ef-
fectuated from an officer’s bad intentions will not itself give rise to a 
Fourth Amendment violation, nor will an officer’s use of force with 
good intentions save it from a constitutional violation.149 
Courts have “long recognized that the right to make an arrest 
or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some 
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”150  “Not 
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the 
peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.”151  
When analyzing excessive force claims, courts must not lose sight 
 
143 Id.  “The question is not simply whether the force was necessary to accomplish a legit-
imate police objective; it is whether the force used was reasonable in light of all the relevant 
circumstances.”  Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). 
144 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  These three considerations later became known as “the 
three Graham factors.”  Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2010). 
145 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 396-97. 
148 Id. at 397. 
149 Id. 
150 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
151 Id.  
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“of the fact that ‘the integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished 
value of our society.’ ”152  In the case of Tracy v. Freshwater,153 the 
Second Circuit found an officer’s act of spraying a handcuffed sus-
pect in the face with pepper spray while attempting to effectuate an 
arrest was an unreasonable use of force under the Fourth Amend-
ment.154  The use of pepper spray has painful and incapacitating ef-
fects, which constitutes a “significant degree of force.”155  Recogniz-
ing that the use of pepper spray constitutes a “significant degree of 
force,” the court noted “it should not be used lightly or gratuitously 
against an arrestee who is complying with police commands or oth-
erwise poses no immediate threat to the arresting officer.”156  Similar-
ly, in Orem v. Rephann,157 the Fourth Circuit held that the use of a 
taser gun on a woman being transported in the back seat of a police 
car, who was in both hand and foot restraints, was an objectively un-
reasonable use of force in that the taser gun was neither used to pro-
tect the officers, nor used to prevent the woman’s escape.158  On the 
other hand, in the Eighth Circuit case of Mckenney v. Harrison,159 the 
court held the use of a taser on a misdemeanor suspect was objective-
ly reasonable in order to prevent his escape as the suspect attempted 
to flee through a window.160 
V. EXCLUSIONARY RULE: GROUNDS FOR SUPPRESSION 
Although the Fourth Amendment does not itself provide a 
mechanism for enforcing its rights, it is well settled that “[w]hen law 
 
152 Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772). 
153 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010). 
154 Id. at 98.  In Tracy the court was asked to review four separate claims of excessive 
force but found only the use of the pepper spray to violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 96-
97.  The court found the other displays of force by the officer were reasonable, specifically 
when the officer struck the defendant with a flashlight several times, jumped on top of the 
defendant when he tried to flee, and when he forcibly moved the defendant to the ground 
despite his claims of pain.  Id. at 97-98. 
155 Id. at 98. 
156 Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98. 
157 523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008). 
158 Id. at 446, 448-49.  While the excessive force claim in Orem falls under the Fourteenth 
Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment because the claimant, though not formally 
charged, had already been arrested and was in the process of being transported when she was 
tased, it is a noteworthy example because the court held, even under the more stringent due 
process standard, that the use of the taser constituted excessive force.  Id. at 446. 
159 635 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2011). 
160 Id. at 360. 
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enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting an 
unreasonable search and seizure, the exclusionary rule may bar the 
admission of the evidence obtained directly and indirectly from the 
violation.”161  The suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence is not 
constitutionally required,162 but rather, the rule exists as a “prophylac-
tic measure created by the judiciary to protect individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.”163  It was in 1914, with the case of Weeks v. 
United States,164 that the Court first applied the exclusionary rule to 
federal prosecutions.165  However, it was not until 1961, forty-six 
years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,166 that the Court finally recognized the 
need for exclusionary protections at the state level and mandated the 
prophylactic rule be applied to the States.167 
As the Court discussed in Mapp, the exclusionary rule is in-
tended, first, to serve as a deterrent for lawless police conduct by dis-
couraging officers from violating an individual’s constitutional rights 
to obtain evidence; second, to maintain judicial integrity; and third, to 
provided a remedial measure for those individuals whose rights were 
violated.168  However, due to the extremely diverse nature of encoun-
ters between police and citizens, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule is often difficult to properly invoke and therefore does not al-
ways carry out its intended functions.169  Despite the practical diffi-
culties in invoking the rule, the Court maintains, where police con-
duct is “over-bearing or harassing, or [ ] trenches upon personal 
security without the objective evidentiary justification which the 
 
161 United States v. Gray, 302 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (S.D.W. Va. 2004). 
162 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.  The exclusionary rule applies both to primary evidence seized 
as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure as well as to derivative evidence later discov-
ered as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). 
163 Gray, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 651. 
164 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
165 Id. at 398. 
166 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
167 Id. at 660. 
168 Id. at 648, 651, 655-56, 659. 
169 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).  The Supreme Court recognized “[n]o judicial 
opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter” and because of this im-
measurable variety of circumstances, the facts of each case must be viewed on a case by case 
basis.  Id. at 15.  On one side of the debate, law enforcement officials argue that there is a 
need for flexibility in dealing with potentially dangerous situations that unfold when making 
either a stop or an arrest, and anything discovered incident to the stop or arrest should be 
admissible.  Id. at 10.  On the other side, advocates of heightened Fourth Amendment protec-
tions argue that specific justification should be required for intrusions on protected personal 
security as it goes to the heart of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 11. 
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Constitution requires . . . it must be condemned by the judiciary and 
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”170 
Although the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule provides 
vital safeguards, it is not itself a fundamental right and therefore is 
not automatically applied.171  Despite being commonly referred to as 
“ ‘the exclusionary rule’ in theory it is best classified as a privilege, 
since it keeps out of evidence matter of probative weight in order to 
serve an extrinsic social policy.”172  As a general rule, 
[t]he exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evi-
dence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful 
search and of testimony concerning knowledge ac-
quired during an unlawful search.  Beyond that, the 
exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of de-
rivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is 
the product of the primary evidence, or that is other-
wise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful 
search.173 
As the Court stated in Herring v. United States,174 “[t]o trigger 
the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate 
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”175  This 
 
170 Id. at 15. 
171 Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.  “The Court has limited the scope of the rule to ‘areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’ ”  Alan Copelin, A Time to Act:  
Statutory Exceptions to State-Created Exclusionary Rules, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339, 344 
(1993) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).  “Consequently, the 
rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings, in civil actions, for witness impeachment in 
criminal trials, or to challenge a state conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding when 
the state provided ‘an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment 
claims.’ ”  Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). 
172 PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 408 (4th 
ed. 2012). 
The exclusionary rule is best known in connection with the suppression 
of evidence secured by an illegal search and seizure, [ ] it applies also to 
statements made in connection with an illegal arrest, to confessions ob-
tained involuntarily, during a period of unnecessary delay in bringing an 
arrested person before a magistrate or at a time when the Miranda warn-
ings have not been given, to identifications that are improperly made, and 
to evidence obtained by illegal electronic surveillance. 
Id. 
173 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988). 
174 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
175 Id. at 144. 
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application of the exclusionary rule was further supported by Davis v. 
United States,176 in which the Court stated that “[w]hen the police ex-
hibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for 
Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong 
and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.”177  The Court further ex-
plained that “when the police act with an objectively reasonable 
good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct 
involves only simple isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale 
loses much of its force and exclusion cannot pay its way.”178 
It reasonably follows from the language of the Davis decision 
that there exists, among others, a good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.  In United States v. Leon,179 the Court was asked to de-
cide whether the exclusionary rule should apply to evidence obtained 
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but that 
was subsequently found to be unsupportable by probable cause.180  
After consideration of the exclusionary rule’s primary intended func-
tion, namely deterrence of unlawful police practices, the Court held 
that a good-faith exception should apply to cases where police offic-
ers believed they were acting pursuant to a valid warrant and that the 
evidence discovered as a result, even though otherwise unlawfully 
obtained, should be admissible at trial as part of the prosecution’s 
case in chief.181  The Court reasoned that where an officer relies on 
the validity of a warrant, and that officer’s reliance is objectively rea-
sonable, to exclude evidence obtained in accordance with the war-
rant, despite later finding it to be invalid, would not further the in-
tended functions of the exclusionary rule and therefore should not be 
grounds for suppression.182 
While the good-faith exception applies to primary evidence, 
meaning the evidence obtained as direct result of the police miscon-
duct, federal courts recognize three additional exceptions to the ex-
 
176 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
177 Id. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144). 
178 Id. at 2427-28 (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is no justification for indis-
criminately applying the exclusionary rule to all evidence obtained in violation of an indi-
vidual’s constitutional rights as such an unwavering application “may well ‘generate disre-
spect for the law and administration of justice.’ ”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (quoting Stone, 428 
U.S. at 491). 
179 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
180 Id. at 900. 
181 Id. at 913. 
182 Id. at 919-20. 
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clusionary rule, which largely apply only to secondary or derivative 
evidence.183  Those exceptions are known as the independent source 
doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, and attenuation.184 
The attenuation exception allows for the introduction of de-
rivative evidence where the causal link between the initial miscon-
duct and the secondary evidence obtained becomes so distant that 
“the taint of misconduct was dissipated to the point that the law 
would not require exclusion.”185  “The point at which the taint be-
comes attenuated has been viewed as ‘the point of diminishing re-
turns’ of the deterrence principle, at which point the detrimental con-
sequences of the illegal police action no longer justify the cost of 
exclusion.”186 
The independent source doctrine, allows for the introduction 
of secondary evidence, upon showing that the taint of the official 
misconduct was not the direct cause of obtaining the secondary evi-
dence.  In other words, where secondary evidence “has been discov-
ered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation,” 
said evidence my still be admissible in a criminal prosecution.187  As 
the Court stated in the case of Wong Sun v. United States188 
We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poi-
sonous tree simply because it would not have come to 
light but for the illegal actions of the police.  Rather, 
the more apt question in such a case is whether, grant-
ing establishment of the primary illegality, the evi-
dence to which instant objection is made has been 
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
taint.189 
The rationale behind the independent source exception has been de-
scribed as follows: 
[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police 
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive 
 
183 Copelin, supra note 171, at 349. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 346. 
186 Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery:  An Exception Beyond the Fruits, 20 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 79, 90 (1992). 
187 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). 
188 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
189 Id. at 487-88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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all probative evidence of a crime are properly bal-
anced by putting the police in the same, not worse, po-
sition that they would have been if no police error or 
misconduct had occurred.  When then challenged evi-
dence has an independent source, exclusion of such 
evidence would put the police in a worse position than 
they would have been in absent any error or viola-
tion.190 
Lastly, the inevitable discovery doctrine, established by the 
Court in Nix v. Williams,191 allows for the introduction of evidence, 
although otherwise unlawfully obtained, if that evidence would have 
inevitably been discovered through some other lawful means.192  
However, when the facts of the case, which dealt solely with admis-
sibility of secondary evidence, are considered with the specific lan-
guage of the Court’s opinion, and both the rationale and case law ap-
plied by the Court, the Nix decision has been interpreted as applying 
the inevitable discovery doctrine only to derivative evidence.193  
Since Nix remains the sole Supreme Court decision dealing directly 
with this exclusionary rule exception in the context of secondary evi-
dence, one must look to the lower federal courts for additional guid-
ance in this area.194 
Although the Court’s limited application of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine to secondary evidence has found support in some of 
the lower federal courts, like for example, by the D.C. Circuit in case 
of United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency.195  In that case, the 
court refused to extend the exception to primary evidence, which the 
government argued would have inevitably been discovered, despite 
the unconstitutional search because of a preexisting inventory search 
procedure.196  However, unlike the D.C. Circuit, to date, “[m]ost of 
the circuits have utilized the inevitable discovery exception to allow 
the introduction of primary evidence.”197  The Second Circuit, for ex-
ample, does not distinguish primary evidence from secondary evi-
 
190 Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
191 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
192 Copelin, supra note 171, at 347. 
193 Bloom, supra note 186, at 90. 
194 Id. 
195 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
196 Bloom, supra note 186, at 90-91. 
197 Id. at 87. 
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dence when applying the inevitable discovery doctrine.198  In the case 
of United States v. Pimentel,199 the Second Circuit, expressly rejected 
the distinction between primary and derivative evidence and purpose-
fully “characterized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, rather than an exception to the fruits of the poisonous 
tree doctrine.”200 
VI. NEW YORK STATE 
A. Search and Seizure and the Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure were first incorporated by way of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, and therefore, made applicable to 
states in the case of Wolf v. Colorado.201  In Wolf, while the Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states, it re-
fused to likewise incorporate the exclusionary rule.202  However, Wolf 
was subsequently overturned by Mapp, in which the Court estab-
lished that both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule ap-
ply to the states.203  The rights created by the federal constitution rep-
resent the minima of rights that every state must uphold; yet, inherent 
in a state’s police power is the authority for it to afford greater pro-
tections than those afforded under the federal constitution. 
The language of Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State 
Constitution is identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.204  In turn, New York courts recognize 
that the respective constitutions confer similar, albeit not identical, 
search and seizure rights on individuals.205  Furthermore, the New 
York Court of Appeals “has not hesitated to expand the rights of New 
York citizens beyond those required by the Federal Constitution” of-
ten affording greater search and seizure protections than those afford-
 
198 Id. at 87 n.46. 
199 810 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1987). 
200 Bloom, supra note 186, at 87 n.46. 
201 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
202 Id. at 33. 
203 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
204 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
205 Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 642. 
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ed under the Fourth Amendment.206 
When analyzing the constitutionality of a challenged search or 
seizure, the first question a court must answer is whether there was in 
fact a search or seizure of an individual’s person or property.  If there 
was, then the second question is whether the search or seizure was 
conducted in a manner that was reasonable under the circumstances.  
New York courts are generally in agreement with federal courts as to 
what actions constitute a search or seizure.207  With respect to intru-
sions into a persons’ body, the Court of Appeals has recognized that 
taking a blood or saliva sample for DNA analysis is a search under 
both the federal and state constitution.208  “It is beyond cavil that an 
individual has a legitimate privacy expectation with respect to the 
blood flowing through his or her own veins, and a corresponding 
right to be free from the unreasonable search and seizure of such bod-
ily fluids.”209 
With respect to what is considered a search, the major differ-
ence between the federal and New York approaches is that New York 
law, unlike federal law, considers discriminate and nonintrusive in-
vestigative methods, which reveal only evidence of criminality to be 
search.210  As the court stated in People v. Dunn,211 “[u]nlike the Su-
preme Court, we believe that the fact that a given investigative pro-
cedure can disclose only evidence of criminality should have little 
bearing on whether it constitutes a search.”212  The court further ex-
plained, “[n]ot withstanding such a method’s discriminate and non-
intrusive nature, it remains a way of detecting the contents of a pri-
vate place.”213  Therefore, under New York law, wherever there is an 
intrusion by the government into an area carrying with it a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, a search occurs regardless of whether the in-
vestigative methods used are largely nonintrusive.214 
With respect to the seizure of a person, under federal law, a 
 
206 Id. 
207 People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990).  A search occurs when the gov-
ernment intrudes on an area which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.   
Id. at 1058. 
208 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
209 People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997). 
210 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058. 
211 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990). 
212 Id. at 1057. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 1058. 
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seizure occurs when a person is either physically restrained or other-
wise submits to a show of authority.215  However, “for reasons pecu-
liar to New York” a seizure of a person does not require an actual 
submission to a show of authority, but instead, “[t]he test is whether a 
reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that 
the officer’s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her free-
dom.”216  Under both the federal and state constitution, a seizure of 
property occurs when the government interferes with an individual’s 
recognized property interest.217 
It is a well established that any search or seizure conducted 
absent a warrant properly issued by a neutral magistrate based upon a 
finding of probable cause is presumptively unreasonable.218  New 
York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) authorizes a criminal 
court to issue a search warrant “upon application of a police officer, a 
district attorney, or other public servant acting in the course of his of-
ficial duties.”219  The NYCPL defines a search warrant, in pertinent 
part, as 
a court order and process directing a police officer to 
conduct [ ]a search of designated premises, or of a 
designated vehicle, or of a designated person, for the 
purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of 
property, and to deliver any property so obtained to 
the court which issued the warrant.220 
In New York, probable cause to issue a warrant requires, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, sufficient information “to support a rea-
sonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed or that 
evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place.”221  It does not, 
however, “require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”222 
When a search is conducted pursuant to valid warrant, under 
the NYCPL, a individual’s personal property may then be subject to 
seizure “if there is reasonable cause to believe that it . . . [c]onstitutes 
 
215 People v. Bora, 634 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1994). 
216 Id.  
217 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.05(2)-(2)(a) (McKinney 1999). 
218 People v. Hodge, 378 N.E.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. 1978). 
219 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.05(1) (McKinney 1999). 
220 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.05(2)-(2)(a) (McKinney 1999). 
221 People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1985). 
222 Id. 
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evidence or tends to demonstrate that an offense was committed . . . 
or that a particular person participated in the commission of an of-
fense.”223  The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that tak-
ing blood samples constitutes personal property within the confines 
of the NYCPL, and therefore, can be seized pursuant to a valid court 
order.224 
Under search and seizure law, the issue of obtaining a DNA 
sample from an individual is two-fold in that is requires both the 
“seizure of the person [ ] to bring him into contact with government 
agents” and then “the subsequent search for and seizure of the evi-
dence.”225  These two issues must be considered separately.226  With 
respect to the initial “ ‘detention’–and thus the ‘seizure’–of an indi-
vidual to obtain physical evidence,” New York courts, in accord with 
the Supreme Court, absent exigent circumstances require a “judicial 
determination of probable cause . . . prior to the seizure.”227  As the 
Court stated in the Matter of Abe A.,228 “when the physical evidence 
whose possession is the raison d’etre for detaining a person cannot 
be altered or destroyed, as in the case of the type of blood integral to 
one’s body, by definition there can be no exigency to justify exemp-
tion from the warrant standard of probable cause.”229 
Once an individual is detained for the purpose of taking a 
DNA sample, the conditions under which the sample is taken must 
comport with the individual’s constitutional rights.230  Protections 
against unwarranted bodily intrusion are of the highest importance 
under search and seizure law, and therefore, require a court find more 
than just the basic threshold requirements of other areas of search and 
seizure law.231  A valid court order to obtain a DNA or other similar 
bodily sample requires a showing that there is “(1) probable cause to 
believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2) a ‘clear indication’ 
 
223 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.10(4) (McKinney 1999). 
224 In re Abe A., 437 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1982). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 269.  The court in the Matter of Abe A. noted that there are several states which 
require a lesser showing than that of probable cause to authorize seizures for the purpose of 
obtaining physical evidence, however, New York courts maintain that probable cause is the 
proper standard in such cases.  Id. 
228 437 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1982). 
229 Id. at 269. 
230 Id. at 270. 
231 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
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that the relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) [that] the 
method used to secure it is safe and reliable.”232  Further, “the issuing 
court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the 
evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive 
means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against the concern for the 
suspect’s constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion on the 
other.”233  “Only if this stringent standard is met . . . may the intrusion 
be sustained.”234 
Although the warrant requirement is the most basic aspect of 
reasonableness that is not to say that all searches or seizures conduct-
ed absent a warrant are unreasonable.  Under both federal and state 
law, a search or seizure conducted absent a warrant may nevertheless 
be deemed reasonable if it falls within one of the “categorical excep-
tions.”235  Among the “categorical exceptions” to the warrant re-
quirement recognized by both New York and federal courts is a 
search and seizure made incident to lawful arrest, the plain view doc-
trine, the automobile exception, consent, and exigent circumstanc-
es.236  In support of the justifications that underlie each of these cate-
gorical exceptions, the Court of Appeals in People v. Singleteary237 
observed that the “law of search and seizure has not become so re-
condite that it condemns necessarily prompt reasonable conduct in 
effecting the interests of public safety in crimes involving murder, as-
saults, deadly weapons, and the like.”238  Thus, when obtaining a war-
rant would cause “inexcusable delay in an immediate and urgent in-
vestigation”, especially with respect to violent crimes, which in effect 
could frustrate the apprehension of the person or persons who com-
mitted the crime, there is reasonable justification for dispensing the 
warrant requirement.239 
 
232 Id.  Requiring a “ ‘clear indication’ that the intrusion will supply substantial probative 
evidence . . . insur[es] that the evidence expected to be found is of importance, [and thereby] 
guards against a ‘fishing expedition.’ ”  In re Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 270.  In addition, “the 
method by which the authorized intrusion is to be accomplished must be safe, reliable and 
impose no more physical discomfort than is reasonably necessary.”  Id. 
233 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
234 Id. 
235 People v. Singleteary, 324 N.E.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. 1974). 
236 Id. 
237 324 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1974). 
238 Id. at 106. 
239 Id. 
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B. Excessive Force Claims 
New York courts closely follow federal law with respect to 
excessive force claims.  Excessive force claims made by an individu-
al occurring “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop of other 
prearraignment seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment 
and its’ standard of objective reasonableness.”240  When deciding 
whether the degree of force exerted was reasonable at this stage, it is 
relevant to consider the State Police Guidelines governing the per-
missible measure of force that may be used to restrain an individu-
al.241  The State Police Guidelines dictate six steps; “namely, the 
physical presence of an officer, employment of a verbal command, 
placement of a hand on the arrestee, the use of pepper spray, the use 
of physical force and the use of deadly physical force.”242  In the case 
of Passino v. State,243 the Court of Appeals held that the use of pep-
per spray to restrain an arrestee who refused to be handcuffed and 
exhibited belligerent behavior was reasonable because the police 
properly complied with the first three levels of the police guidelines 
before resorting to the use of pepper spray.244 
C. The Exclusionary Rule 
As previously discussed, although originally only applicable 
in federal court, the Supreme Court in Mapp determined that the ex-
clusionary rule was incorporated and made applicable to the states by 
way of the Fourteenth Amendment.245  To reiterate, the exclusionary 
rule is a judicially created remedy allowing for the suppression of un-
constitutionally obtained evidence, whether it is a direct or indirect 
product of the government action, which was adopted to safeguard 
individuals’ constitutional rights and deter unlawful police con-
duct.246  While  “[t]he exclusionary rule ‘was originally created to de-
 
240 Passino v. State, 689 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 689 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999). 
244 Id. at 259. 
245 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
246 People v. Pleasant, 430 N.Y.S.2d 592, 593 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980).  This judicially 
created mechanism to secure individual rights was ultimately “[f]ormulated as a pragmatic 
response to law enforcement procedures violative of individual liberties.”  People v. 
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. 1978). 
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ter police unlawfulness by removing the incentive’ to disregard the 
law, [it] also ‘serves to insure that the State itself, and not just its po-
lice officers, respect the constitutional rights of the accused’ ”247  Ul-
timately, this rule provides a mechanism to secure and uphold indi-
vidual rights as it was “[f]ormulated as a pragmatic response to law 
enforcement procedures violative of individual liberties.”248 
Application of the exclusionary rule is not itself a fundamen-
tal right.249  Again, as with the federal application of the rule, uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence, may be excluded, however its appli-
cation “is not without limitations,” and thus, is not automatic.250  
Because the primary justification for the exclusionary rule is its in-
tended deterrent effect, so “[w]hether the rule should apply ‘depends 
upon a balancing of its probable deterrent effect against its detri-
mental impact upon the truth finding process.’ ”251  In applying this 
balancing test, where the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule 
are only tenuously demonstrated, a court might rule to uphold the 
challenged evidence notwithstanding the unconstitutional means with 
which it was obtained.252 
In agreement with the federal approach, New York courts 
recognize numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule.  For in-
stance, New York courts allow the prosecution to rely upon unconsti-
tutionally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings, to impeach-
ment a defendant who takes the stand at trial, or in connection with “a 
witness’ in-court identification.”253  Further, similar to the federal ap-
proach, with respect to secondary evidence, New York courts observe 
the independent source,254 attenuation,255 and inevitable discovery256 
exceptions.  With respect to these three exceptions, however, New 
York courts take a slightly different approach than federal courts by 
limiting the application of these doctrines to secondary evidence even 
 
247 People v. Jones, 810 N.E.2d 415, 419 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting People v. Payton, 412 
N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (N.Y. 1980)). 
248 McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544. 
249 Jones, 810 N.E.2d at 420. 
250 Pleasant, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 593.  “[T]he exclusionary rule has never enjoyed the stature 
of an end in itself, but, rather, has served solely as a means to an end: a remedial device op-
erating essentially upon a principle of deterrence.”  McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544. 
251 Jones, 810 N.E.2d at 420 (quoting McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544). 
252 McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544. 
253 Pleasant, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 593. 
254 People v. Binns, 749 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2002). 
255 People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. 1987). 
256 People v. Turriago, 681 N.E.2d 350, 356 (N.Y. 1997). 
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in cases where the prosecution can show that the primary evidence 
would most likely have been discovered notwithstanding its unlawful 
procurement.257 
Another difference with respect to exclusionary rule excep-
tions is that unlike federal courts, New York courts do not recognize 
the Leon good-faith exception.258  In the case of People v. Bigelow,259 
the police conducted a search of an automobile pursuant to what they 
believed was a valid warrant issued by a county court judge; howev-
er, subsequent to the search, the warrant was deemed invalid based 
on insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.260  
The People in Bigelow argued, based on the Leon decision, that the 
evidence obtained as a result of the search should not be suppressed 
because it was “seized in objective good-faith reliance on a warrant 
mistakenly issued by the magistrate.”261  The Court of Appeals ex-
pressly rejected the Leon rationale that suppression of evidence ob-
tained in good-faith reliance on a warrant would not serve the intend-
ed purpose of the exclusionary rule, specifically in deterring police 
misconduct.262  In rejecting the People’s rationale, the court stated: 
[w]hether or not the police acted in good faith [ ] the 
Leon rule does not help the People’s position. That is 
so because if the People are permitted to use the seized 
evidence, the exclusionary rule’s purpose is complete-
ly frustrated, a premium is placed on the illegal police 
action and a positive incentive is provided to others to 
engage in similar lawless acts in the future.263 
VII. APPLICATION 
In New York, before ordering an uncharged suspect to submit 
to a DNA sample, a court must be convinced by a showing of “prob-
able cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, a ‘clear 
indication’ that the relevant material evidence will be found, and 
 
257 Id. 
258 Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d at 458. 
259 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985). 
260 Id. at 457. 
261 Id. at 457-58. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 458. 
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[that] the method used to secure it is safe and reliable.”264  Moreover, 
“the issuing court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the im-
portance of the evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of 
less intrusive means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against the con-
cern for the suspect’s constitutional right to be free from bodily intru-
sion on the other.”265 
Upon application by the People in Smith, the lower court 
found that the People satisfied these stringent requirements, and 
therefore, provided sufficient justification for the court to issue an or-
der to compel Smith to submit to a DNA sample in the form of a 
buccal swab.266  Smith did not challenge that judicial determination 
on appeal, thereby impliedly conceding that the issuance of the order 
was valid.267  In fact, Smith even complied with that court order and 
provided a DNA sample.268  It was after Smith lawfully complied 
with the court order that the trouble began. 
By no fault of his own and unbeknownst to Smith, the police 
compromised the sample and were forced to request a second court 
order.269  Without notice to Smith, the court granted the request and 
issued a duplicate order, again to compel Smith to submit to a buccal 
swab.270  Acting pursuant to the duplicate order the police picked up 
Smith in order to take a second DNA sample.271  Although Smith did 
not initially resist the police when they picked him up, once at the 
station he refused to open his mouth and submit to the test.272  While 
seated on the floor in a holding room, handcuffed, and surrounded by 
several officers, the police tased Smith’s bare skin to force his com-
pliance.273  This entire exchange, starting the moment Smith was first 
apprehended and ending the moment he was tased, lasted less than 
twenty minutes.274  On appeal, the court held that the DNA evidence 
obtained after Smith was tased required suppression on the grounds 
that the sample was secured as a result of excessive force and in vio-
 









273 Id. at 378. 
274 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 378. 
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lation of Smith’s procedural due process rights.275 
It is fundamental under both federal and state law that all 
searches and seizures carried out by the government be deemed rea-
sonable in order to stand up in court.  The most basic rule in this area 
is that searches and seizures conducted without a warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate based on a finding of probable cause are presump-
tively unreasonable unless the circumstance falls within a well estab-
lished and carefully delineated exception, i.e., consent, search inci-
dent to lawful arrest, and exigent circumstances.276  The 
reasonableness of a search or seizure, whether conducted with or 
without a warrant, turns on the presence of absence of probable 
cause.277  While the search and seizure of Smith’s DNA evidence was 
conducted without a valid warrant and the second order was provided 
and executed in violation of his due process rights, it is clear that 
there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to search 
under the facts of this case.278  However, absent a valid warrant, 
probable cause alone could save neither the search nor the seizure 
from violating Smith’s constitutional rights.279  Yet, the court did not 
carefully consider whether the facts warranted invocation of an ex-
ception to the warrant clause. 
Under the consent exception, the People could have argued 
that Smith consented to the initial seizure of his person because he 
did not resist the police when they apprehended him to take the sam-
ple.280  Without explanation, Smith allowed the police to handcuff 
and transport him to the station where he was detained.281  However, 
even if Smith consented to the seizure of his person and any reasona-
ble search that followed from that seizure, Smith’s consent to search 
was unequivocally revoked by his actions at the station, specifically 
refusing to open his mouth.282 
 
275 Id. at 375. 
276 See supra notes 58-60, 78-79, 235-36. 
277 See supra notes 61, 221. 
278 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
279 Id. at 376-77. 
280 Id. at 378. 
281 Id.  To momentarily enter the mind of Smith, it seems like a reasonable assumption 
that he did not initially resist the officers when they first apprehended him because, knowing 
he had already provided a DNA sample, it is likely he believed was being arrested for his 
connection with the robbery crimes.  While there is nothing in the present decision that ex-
pressly supports this assumption, it is a reasonable inference based on the facts of the case. 
282 Id. 
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With respect to the exigent circumstances exception, both 
federal and New York state courts have recognized that there are sit-
uations in which the need to preserve evidence is time sensitive, and 
thus, justifies a warrantless search.283  An example of when such time 
sensitive circumstances are present is where the police must preserve 
evidence of a suspect’s blood-alcohol level.284  However unlike blood 
alcohol content, DNA evidence, by its very nature is unchanging, 
which means it does not fall within the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to justify the warrantless intrusion into Smith’s body.285 
The next exception to the warrant requirement worthy of con-
sideration in this context was search incident to lawful arrest.  The 
application of this exception is a little trickier because Smith was not 
technically placed under arrest before the sample was taken; howev-
er, there is no dispute that there was at a minimum, probable cause to 
issue the search warrant for Smith’s DNA for his suspected connec-
tion with the unsolved robbery crimes.286  Nevertheless, Smith was 
still classified as merely a detainee when the sample was taken, and 
thus, the warrantless search of his body did not fall within this excep-
tion. 
When considering reasonableness, whether carried out pursu-
ant to a valid warrant or one of the categorical exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, the manner in which the search or seizure is con-
ducted is relevant to a court’s assessment of its constitutionality.  The 
second court order in the Smith case, although invalid for due process 
reasons, called for the DNA sample to be taken by a buccal swab 
procedure, which is a minimally intrusive, if not one of the least in-
trusive means of obtaining a DNA sample.287  However, the constitu-
tional predicament arose because Smith was forcibly tased by the po-
lice as a method used to obtain Smith’s compliance with the order 
and submission to what would otherwise have been viewed as a min-
imally intrusive procedure.288 
Excessive force claims are judged by reference to the legal 
status of the individual alleging the violation.289  Claims of free citi-
 
283 See supra notes 86, 239. 
284 See supra note 92. 
285 See supra notes 93, 229. 
286 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 See supra note 115. 
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zens are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment objective reasona-
bleness standard, while claims of arrestees, and pretrial detainees are 
analyzed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clauses applying the four-factor Johnson test in order to determine if 
the force used amounted to punishment.290  The difficulty in applying 
these tests is that the courts are not clear on where the detention of a 
free citizen ends and where pretrial detention begins.291  Neverthe-
less, this distinction is carries importance, as the Fourth Amendment 
standard provides greater protection to an individual’s privacy and 
security rights than afforded by either the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.292 
In the present case, Smith was a suspect who was detained to 
effectuate his compliance with a court order.293  Based on that fact, 
Smith was still a free citizen, which means that his excessive force 
claim required analysis under the Fourth Amendment, using its objec-
tive reasonableness standard.294  However, it is arguable that at some 
point during his detention, prior to the police’s use of the taser, 
Smith’s status transformed into that of an arrestee.  Nevertheless, un-
der the Fourth Amendment standard, the use of the taser on Smith 
who was handcuffed and detained at the police station, and thus, not 
at risk of flight and presented no immediate threat to the police, was 
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.295  Smith did not 
become violent or aggressive, bur rather, merely refused to open his 
mouth.296  Moreover, there were no other exigencies to justify the 
immediate need for the police to obtain the sample.297  As previously 
discussed, DNA evidence by nature is unchanging, which created a 
challenge for the officers to argue any justification for resorting to 
use of a taser on Smith.298  The police engaged in such conduct just to 
obtain a sample that would have yielded precisely the same eviden-
tiary results had they exhausted more reasonable methods first.  As 
such, the Appellate Division properly found the use of the taser in 
 
290 See supra notes 131-36, 141. 
291 See supra notes 121-23. 
292 See supra notes 131-50. 
293 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
294 Id. at 376-78. 
295 Id. at 378. 
296 Id.  
297 Id.  
298 See supra notes 93, 229, 285. 
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this case amounted to a constitutional violation.299 
When evidence is obtained in violation of an individual’s 
constitutional rights, one remedy is to suppress the evidence at tri-
al.300  Because the purpose of this exclusionary rule is to deter unlaw-
ful police practices, where suppression would not serve its greater so-
cietal function, evidence obtained both as a direct and/or indirect 
result of the violation may still be introduced under certain circum-
stances.301  These exceptions to the exclusionary rule include, inevi-
table discovery, attenuation, independent source, and good-faith reli-
ance on an invalid warrant.302 
Addressing the good faith exception first, federal courts may 
allow the introduction of evidence at trial, both primary and derivate, 
where a search or seizure was carried out by police officers in an ob-
jective good-faith reliance on a warrant, even when that warrant is 
later found invalid.303  The idea is that the deterrent effect of the sup-
pressing evidence obtained as result of unlawful police practices is 
not served when the police act in accordance with what they believe 
to be a valid warrant.304  New York courts on the other hand, refuse to 
recognize this exception arguing that allowing the introduction of un-
constitutionally obtained evidence, even if the police claim to have 
been acting in good faith, frustrates the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule and in effect could work as an incentive for future lawless ac-
tion.305  Accordingly, had Smith been decided under federal law, be-
cause the police took the sample in good-faith reliance on the validity 
of the second court order, even though the sample was the primary 
evidence obtained as a result of the constitutional violation, the DNA 
evidence may have been admissible at trial as part of the govern-
ment’s case in chief.  However, under New York law, had Smith 
raised this issue on appeal, regardless of whether or not the police 
acted in good-faith reliance on the validity of the second court order, 
Smith’s DNA evidence would likely have been suppressed. 
With respect to the independent source, attenuation, and in-
evitable discovery exceptions, as a general rule these only apply to 
 
299 Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78. 
300 See supra notes 245-48. 
301 See supra notes 171-75, 249-56. 
302 See supra notes 183-94, 254-57. 
303 See supra notes 179-80. 
304 See supra notes 181-82. 
305 See supra notes 258-63. 
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the admission of evidence obtained secondary to the constitutional 
violation.306  In Smith, neither the independent source nor the attenua-
tion exceptions are relevant under the facts presented; however, the 
inevitable discovery exception raises some interesting issues. 
The inevitable discovery exception allows for the introduction 
of otherwise unconstitutionally obtained evidence at trial if through 
some other police practice, the challenged evidence would have inev-
itably been discovered.307  To date, the Supreme Court has only dealt 
with the inevitable discovery exception in the context of secondary 
evidence, and therefore, the precedent is limited and the question of 
whether it applies to primary evidence remains open to state court’s 
discretion.308  However, most of the lower federal courts, including 
for example the Second Circuit, have extended the inevitable discov-
ery exception to apply both to the introduction of primary and sec-
ondary evidence.309  Despite this expansive interpretation by lower 
federal courts, New York courts refuse to extend application of the 
inevitable discovery exception beyond that of secondary evidence.310 
In Smith, the court issued not one, but two orders compelling 
Smith to submit to a DNA test.311  Interestingly, Smith complied with 
the first order but the police compromised the sample.312  Thereafter, 
when Smith refused to submit to the second order the police forced 
his compliance by way of a taser gun.313  The DNA evidence would 
therefore constitute primary evidence since it was obtained as a direct 
result of the constitutional violation.  If analyzed under federal law, a 
majority of the lower federal courts would likely find that the DNA 
evidence admissible at trial.  Not only did the court issue two orders 
prior to the violation, but those orders were supported by probable 
cause.314  Furthermore, had the police exhausted other options to 
force Smith to comply with the order, such as holding him in con-
tempt, the police would have inevitably obtained the DNA evidence.  
However, in a minority of federal courts and under New York law, 
the inevitable discovery exception would not apply because Smith’s 
 
306 See supra notes 185-94, 253-55. 
307 See supra notes 191-92. 
308 See supra notes 191-94. 
309 See supra notes 193-94. 
310 See supra notes 256-57. 
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DNA sample was primary evidence, thus requiring suppression at tri-
al to remedy the constitutional violation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The New York State Constitution generally provides individ-
uals with greater search and seizure rights than those afforded under 
the United States Constitution.  When evidence is obtained in viola-
tion of an individual’s constitutional rights, under New York law, 
courts are more likely to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence at trial than federal courts.  Interestingly, despite the fact that 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government, particularly in the area of forced bodily intrusions, is 
one of the most fundamental rights of for individuals, the federal in-
terpretation of the exclusionary rule, in many instances, may leave an 
individual without remedy for constitutional violations in this area.  
New York State’s interpretation of the exclusionary rule is more pro-
tective of individuals’ rights, and therefore, the protections afforded 
to individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures would best 
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